Us Singapore Status Of Forces Agreement

DCAs also increase ex-post confidence. For example, in 2002, Iran`s defence minister described his country`s DCA with Kuwait as an “effort of confidence,” repeating a recurring phrase in the statements of the heads of state and government and in the texts of the DCAs themselves. Footnote 44 The Prime Ministers of China and India highlighted this logic in a joint public statement on their 2005 DCA, stressing that “the expansion and deepening of defence exchanges between the two countries is essential to strengthen mutual trust and mutual understanding between the two armed forces.” Footnote 45 DCAs creates trust by repeatedly associating governments with concrete acts of cooperation that do not involve trivial risks. Footnote 46 While cooperation issues are mainly related to ex ante trust, I will show later that increased ex post confidence reinforces the network effects of DCAs. The demand for DCAs is rooted in a combination of historical events at the system level, including the case of communism, the reduction of intergovernmental conflicts and, in particular, the increase in non-traditional threats. These changes are largely global and secular and were implemented in the final days of the Cold War. Historical evidence shows a shift in the language of defence cooperation in the 1980s. In 1981, the United States and Israel signed a traditional defense agreement, not a DCA agreement “developed against threats that the Soviet Union or the forces of the former Soviet Union threaten the peace and security of the region.” Footnote 52 At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Israel was “wanting to forge a new definition of its partnership with the world`s only superpower.” Footnote 53 Attention has shifted to civil wars in the Balkans, instability in Algeria, the proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and “a common interest in deterring Central Asian states from becoming bastions of Islamic extremism.” Footnote 54 Together, these characteristics define DCAs as a form of cooperation in its own right. The annex also describes the differences between DCAs and defence and non-attack pacts, as well as the status of military agreements (SOFAs), strategic partnerships and confidence-building measures (CBM). It also contains an example of a full text of a DCA. Between DCAs, the problem is the main source of heterogeneity. Some agreements, such as the DCA between France and India, cover all possible areas of defence cooperation.

Others are narrower and only partially cover the key themes I have described. For example, countries can sign a DCA on mutual consultations and another on cooperation in the defence sector. However, governments recognize these narrower agreements as part of a broader defence framework; Indeed, they often use generic DCAs to combine various work-pieces. When Bangladesh and China signed a DCA in 2002, their respective prime ministers said it was necessary to “institutionalize existing defence agreements and streamline existing fragmentary labour agreements to improve cooperation in training, maintenance and certain production sectors.” Footnote 19 Whether the DCAs take the form of an agreement or a set of agreements, they move towards the single objective of an institutionalized defence framework. I study DCA heterogeneity in the appendix and show that the empirical results are robust, even if the analysis is limited to the most common DCAs. Historically, states have attempted to report security to partners of their partners. In 1997, Romania declared that it would “increase its chances of quickly joining NATO by developing a new partnership with Hungary”, with a clear anticipation that Hungary`s Willingness to sign an agreement would reassure Hungary`s partners – NATO member countries – of Romania`s intentions. Footnote 93 Estonia`s defence minister similarly described a DCA with Turkey as a way to “show s